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EMBODIED VS. NON-EMBODIED MODES OF KNOWING 
IN AQUINAS: DIFFERENT UNIVERSALS, DIFFERENT 
INTELLIGIBLE SPECIES, DIFFERENT INTELLECTS
Therese Scarpelli Cory
What does it mean to be an embodied thinker of abstract concepts? Does embodi-
ment shape the character and quality of our understanding of universals such 
as “dog” and “beauty,” and would a non-embodied mind understand such 
concepts differently? I examine these questions through the lens of Thomas 
Aquinas’s remarks on the differences between embodied (human) intellects 
and non-embodied (angelic) intellects. In Aquinas, I argue, the difference 
between embodied and non-embodied intellection of extramental realities is 
rooted in the fact that embodied and non-embodied intellects grasp different 
kinds of universals by means of different kinds of intelligible species (intellec-
tual likenesses), which elicit in them different “modes” of understanding. By 
spelling out what exactly it means to be an embodied knower, on Aquinas’s 
account, I argue, we can also shed new light on his mysterious claim that the 
embodied intellect “turns to phantasms”—the imagination’s likenesses of in-
dividuals—in its acts of understanding.
One of the interesting questions, for theories that ascribe to us some sort 
of immaterial part (a soul or mind), concerns the extent to which being an 
embodied mind has distinctive repercussions on our conscious life. Some 
features of our conscious life seem distinctively bodily, e.g., the feeling of 
being oriented in space and the awareness of the relative position of one’s 
body parts (proprioception). But apart from proprioception, the way for-
ward is not so clear, as the following two puzzles illustrate. On the one 
hand, assuming that an immaterial mind should be capable of at least some 
mental activities that are independent from physiological structures, one 
might wonder whether these activities, in us, are just the same kind as those 
of non-embodied minds—or whether there is something unique about the 
immaterial activities of an embodied mind. On the other hand, where our 
mental activities seem linked in some way to a physiological structure, one 
might wonder how essential those structures are for rendering the kinds 
of experiences we have. Is it in principle possible to have the experience 
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“hearing Beethoven’s Ninth” without the relevant physiological apparatus 
of eardrum, auditory nerve, brainstem, auditory cortex? For instance: If 
a non-embodied mind had been present for the opening night of Beetho-
ven’s Ninth (setting aside concerns about how a non-embodied mind gains 
entrance to an auditorium!), it is not obvious whether it would have (i) the 
experience that we call “hearing Beethoven’s Ninth,” or (ii) a different kind 
of experience of musical sounds, or (iii) no experience of musical sounds 
at all.
These two puzzles are just two ways into the same problem: What dif-
ference does embodiment make to the qualitative feel and content of human 
experience? In this study, I intend to unpack how this problem is handled 
by the medieval thinker Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas often uses angelic cog-
nition as a counterpoint in discussing human cognition (and vice versa), 
producing especially sharp and revealing contrasts between embodied vs. 
non-embodied conscious experience. On his view, our conscious life is a 
whole constituted by the activities of multiple mental powers. Embodied 
minds have—and non-embodied minds lack—many kinds of essentially 
bodily mental activities, i.e., sensory and imaginative activities. Where we 
have kinship with angels, however, is in the non-bodily activity of intellect 
(let us call it “knowing”), which accounts for our ability to think about 
universals such as “dog” or “beauty,” and to grasp things as instances of 
some common kind, e.g., as a dog or as beautiful.1 But Aquinas resists the 
implication that our intellectual knowing is basically an angelic activity 
mixed in with bodily sensory activities, arguing instead that there is some-
thing distinctive about embodied knowing.2
But distinctive in what way? The usual answer in the Aquinas scholar-
ship is to point to something that amounts to a merely quantitative 
difference: Embodied knowing is characterized by its discursivity (use 
of propositions and arguments), which is the result of how little we are 
able to grasp intellectually in a single act. Thus angelic intellects intuit 
whole swathes of reality at once, while we must put the picture together 
piecemeal by constructing propositions and arguments.3 On this standard 
1There is also an accompanying non-bodily power of will, but I am only focusing on 
cognitive powers here.
2Indeed, it is crucial to Aquinas’s campaign to secure a unified human substance, that 
human souls and angels be different kinds of intellectual forms. ST I 75.7, I 88.2 ad 3; see also 
In III Sent. d.23 1.2 ad 2; I 88.2 ad 3. So it is not surprising that he would also think that their 
mental activity must be different in kind. In referencing and citing the works of Aquinas, I 
have used the Leonine edition for all the works cited here, except where unavailable, i.e., for 
Scriptum super libros sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi, Quaestiones disputatae de potentia, In 
duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, Super Librum de causis expositio, and In li-
brum Beati Dionysii De diviinis nominibus expositio (see the reference list for those editions). All 
translations from Latin are my own. Abbreviations of commonly cited works: ST = Summa 
theologiae; SCG = Summa contra gentiles; In Sent. = Commentary on the Sentences; DV = Quaes-
tiones disputatae de veritate; CT = Compendium theologiae; DSS = De substantiis separatis; QDDA 
= Quaestiones disputatae de anima.
3For an example in print, see Péghaire, Intellectus et ratio, 31–71 and 85–102. The difference 
is due to the “weakness” of our intellectual light, compared to the “fullness” of the angelic 
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reading of Aquinas, embodied and non-embodied intellects are engaging 
in the same activity φ-ing, differing only in their “skill level”: Embodied in-
tellects are deficient φ-ers while non-embodied intellects are skilled φ-ers, 
in the manner of an apprentice and a master silversmith crafting the same 
kind of vase, one with many slow, imperfect movements and the other 
with fewer, more accurate movements.4
But this narrative has persistently glossed over a more substantive and 
illuminating difference between embodied and non-embodied knowing. 
This study aims to show that for Aquinas, embodied and non-embodied 
knowing are different kinds or modes of cognition altogether—like φ-ing 
and ψ-ing—because the distinctive causal genealogy of embodied vs. 
non-embodied intellectual acts results in experiences that have fundamentally 
different structures. For medieval thinkers, universals come in different 
kinds, and embodied vs. non-embodied knowing are the different modes 
of cognition that correspond to different kinds of universal. As a result, 
the activity of an embodied intellect is fundamentally incomplete without 
the concurrent activity of imagination—which sheds new light on why 
Aquinas describes embodied knowing as a mode of knowing “by turning 
to phantasms.”
As I will show, then, that although embodied and non-embodied 
knowing do have certain features in common that warrant their both being 
called “intellective” at some generic level of abstraction, we should think 
of them as different kinds of knowing, in the manner that knowing in 
general is different from, e.g., hearing or seeing.5 Or to put it in the closest 
contemporary terms (merely as a useful heuristic and without suggesting 
intellectual light. ST I 58.3 is typical; see also I 55.2c, I 58.4–5. The process is described ex-
tensively in Kretzmann, “Infallibility, Error, and Ignorance,” 185–193; Péghaire, Intellectus et 
ratio also remains a useful treatment. Another difference that Aquinas sometimes mentions 
also seems to indicate the defectiveness of embodied cognition: namely, our intellects are in-
termittently active, whereas angels are always actually understanding. The reason is that the 
human intellect is by nature a potency for intelligible form and must therefore be activated, 
whereas “in angels there is no potency bare of act,” because angels are innately formed by 
all the intelligible likenesses of natural beings; see ST I 53.1 ad 3; see also I 55.2, I 54.4, I 58.1, 
and I 84.3 ad 1.
4For this reason, Bazán has recently criticized Aquinas for tending “to undervalue 
human nature by unfairly comparing it to hypothetical superior realities,” and proposed 
that scholars should avoid these comparisons (“On Angels,” 80). But recent research has 
shown quite the opposite, i.e., that the full scope of medieval philosophical thought re-
quires scholars to engage with medieval angelology, where crucial thought-experiments for 
medieval philosophy of mind take place. See Nani-Suarez, Connaissance et langage; Perler, 
“Thought Experiments,” 143–153, as well as the other essays in the same volume; and the 
essays in Hoffmann, Companion to Angels.
5Aquinas has distinctive ways of dividing genus-species relationships which affect the 
analysis here. For the precise way in which angelic intellection and human intellection fall 
into a common genus, see Cory, “Is Anything in the Intellect That Was Not First in Sense?,” 
126–136. Note that I am not denying that Aquinas differentiates human knowers from angels 
in terms of the quantitative “scope of a single act” criterion. My point is just that this criterion 
is the one that he uses more broadly to set up a hierarchy of perfection among intellectual 
entities (differentiating not only human knowers from angels, but one angel from another), 
and does not constitute the fundamental difference between embodied and non-embodied 
knowing.
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that Aquinas subscribes to the underlying framework): These are not in-
stances of the same kind of mental state with different contents. Rather, 
they are two different kinds of mental states altogether. Certainly I am not 
denying that embodied knowing ranks as a less perfect kind of intellectual 
activity for Aquinas. Aquinas’s ontology allows for a ranking of perfection 
among kinds, so that, e.g., horses are a more perfect kind of animal than 
oysters. My contentions here are just that although our knowing is an im-
material act, it has a distinctively embodied mode, and that the embodied 
mode of knowing is distinguished by the kind of universal it grasps. From 
that distinctive character it follows that embodied knowing is a less per-
fect mode of knowing than other modes. (Similarly, there is something 
distinctive of horseness and something distinctive of oysterness, from 
which follow their different positions on the scale of animal perfection.)
This study, then, is mainly concerned with Aquinas’s answer to the first 
puzzle mentioned above: Whether our embodiment leaves a distinctive 
mark on all our cognitive experience, including any immaterial cognitive 
activities, or whether our immaterial activities could just as well occur 
in a non-embodied mind. In the first two sections, I will explore Aqui-
nas’s theory of multiple kinds of universal, and show why different kinds 
of universal are grasped by different kinds of mind. The third section 
appeals to the unique features of abstracted universals to explain why em-
bodied knowing necessarily “turns to phantasms” (and what such turning 
means). The fourth section sketches the contribution that embodiment 
makes in “what is it like” for us to know.
But in the course of the investigation, we will also get some clues as 
to Aquinas’s position vis-à-vis the second puzzle, i.e., whether non-em-
bodied (angelic) minds can have anything like our experience of hearing 
music or feeling the warmth of a fire. And so the fifth section considers 
this issue briefly. Note that throughout, by “knowing,” I mean “knowing 
extramental realities,” since self-knowing or knowing God introduce fur-
ther complications that unnecessarily muddy the waters.
1. The Origin of the Species? Creative, Emanated, and Abstracted
In order to cognize anything, a cognitive power must be “formed” in the 
right way: Aquinas calls the forms of sense and intellect “species,” and the 
forms of imagination “phantasms.” Now one of the founding principles of 
Aquinas’s cognition theory is that cognition requires likeness. In order to 
cognize x, the cognitive power’s form must be a likeness of x: An intellect 
must become treeish—acquire a treeish form, i.e., the intelligible species 
“tree”—in order to cognize trees.6
Now the notion of “likeness” operative here is not a narrow psycholog-
ical notion of representation, but a broader metaphysical notion rooted in 
Aquinas’s broader theory of causation, according to which “every agent 
6E.g., ST I 12.2; DV 1.1. 
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makes something like itself” (omne agens agit sibi simile).7 Agents have the 
active powers they have in virtue of what they are, and their actions are 
the expressions of their being: An agent can only give what it has, and 
conversely, there is no likeness without a causal history to back it up. 
What agents do is induce in the patient a form like their own. In some 
cases, as when hot water heats spaghetti, the form induced in the patient 
is of the same kind as the agent’s form (physical heat). But forms can be 
alike without being of the same kind: Aquinas distinguishes between a 
fire igniting a tree (making the wood take on the same kind of form as the 
agent’s), vs. a fire heating iron until it is red hot (making the iron merely 
“fiery”).8 Similarly, the intellect can be immaterially horsified without be-
coming a real material horse, and God’s creatures reflect the divine essence 
without being themselves divine.9 (Note that technically, “likeness” or si-
militudo describes the relation of one form to another form,10 but Aquinas 
more loosely transfers the name “likeness” to the forms themselves that 
are in the likeness relation; it is in that sense that he calls the intelligible 
species a “likeness” of extramental natures.)
So in claiming that cognition requires the likeness of cognizer and 
cognized, Aquinas is committed to the view that cognition requires some 
sort of causal story that accounts for the relevant likeness. The causal re-
lationship is normally direct, and might go either way. On the one hand, 
the object might be the cause that makes the cognizer like itself (e.g., very 
roughly, a horse horsifies my intellect, enabling me to know what a horse 
is). In that case, the cognizer is like the object. On the other hand, the cog-
nizer might be the cause that makes the object like itself (e.g., very roughly, 
Frank Lloyd Wright has a house-idea which he expresses as Fallingwater). 
In that case, the object is like the cognizer. Either way, likeness in one direc-
tion or the other is necessary for cognition.11 (This schematic poses special 
problems for angelic knowing, as we’ll see in a moment.)
As a result, for Aquinas, the causal history of a given case of cognitive 
likeness is extremely important. In a localized way, the causes that make us 
intellectually “like” themselves constrain our intellectual activity: My in-
tellect cannot be treeish (enabling me to know trees directly) if no tree has 
ever acted on my cognitive powers. But as we will see, Aquinas goes a step 
further to hold that different kinds of knower-known causal relationships 
7See, e.g., In Metaph. VII 8, where Aquinas also accommodates the obvious exceptions 
to this principle by noting that it applies only to primary, per se causation (and not, e.g., to 
instrumental causes or causes related to their effect only accidentally). 
8Compendium theologiae I 68.
9In IV Sent. d.44 3.1 ad qc.3, ad 2; SCG I 29; ST I 4.3 ad 4. 
10In Metaph. V 17.
11ST I 14.5–8, I 15.1–3, I 44.4 ad 2; In II Sent. d.3 3.1 ad 2, DV 2.3; SCG IV 11. Note that ob-
jects can also be known indirectly when their effects act directly on the cognizer. The intellect, 
thus assimilated to the effect, can then reason to the cause, as when I surmise a predator’s 
presence when observing the agitation of a flock of birds.
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result not only in differences in what is included in the act of knowing, but 
also in how that knowing is internally structured, so to speak.
For what follows, it will be important to understand how these princi-
ples are applied in specific cases. So let us briefly spell out how the theory 
works for the three kinds of intellectual knowing that Aquinas identifies: 
our embodied knowing, angels’ non-embodied knowing, and God’s 
non-embodied knowing.
In the case of embodied knowing, intellectual likeness is caused by a 
physical object assimilating the intellect to itself. An apple’s color, tex-
ture, and smell affect our physical, living sense-organs, causing sensory 
likenesses that in turn affect the internal senses, culminating in a refined 
internal likeness, called a “phantasm,” of a particular apple in the imag-
ination. Now the phantasm is a bodily form (of the brain) and hence 
cannot act on the immaterial intellect by itself. It receives a boost in causal 
power, however, from the soul’s immaterial intellectual light (the agent 
intellect), so as to cause an immaterial likeness of itself, universal ‘apple,’ 
in the possible intellect. Aquinas calls this causation of immaterial likeness 
“abstraction,” and he calls the intellect’s resulting abstracted likeness to 
“apple” an “intelligible species.” This abstracted intelligible form makes 
the embodied intellect be like “apple” in a universal way, without indexing 
to any particular apple. (The reason for this departicularization, as I’ve 
argued extensively elsewhere, is not that the intellect actively separates 
common features from particular features, as is typical for abstractionist 
theories; rather, the loss of particularization is rather an incidental effect 
of the causal process whereby material things cause immaterial likenesses 
in intellects.)12
Because physical entities can act only on other physical entities, the 
mediation of the external and internal corporeal senses is essential to ab-
stractive cognition. And thus only an embodied intellect can cognize by 
abstractive likeness:
Abstractive likeness: Int knows x by abstractive likeness if and only 
the form whereby Int knows x is caused by x acting through sense and 
imagination (through the power of the agent intellect).
Since only a material thing can act on sense, evidently only a material 
thing can cause an abstractive likeness. An abstracted species’ “direction 
of causal dependence” thus faces toward the physical world, orienting 
the embodied intellect toward phantasms and ultimately toward physical 
individuals—and it properly tends toward a certain mode of use, as will 
become clear in §3 in discussing Aquinas’s “turn to phantasms.”
With respect to non-embodied intellects, however, a difficulty arises. 
According to Aquinas’s general theory of causation, entities on a “lower 
12This paragraph summarizes the interpretation of abstraction defended in Cory, “Re-
thinking Abstractionism.”
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rung” of the ladder of being cannot act on entities on a “higher rung.”13 
The reason is that in moving up the ladder of being, a thing’s agency be-
comes more powerful, and its potential to be affected decreases. At any 
given level, the degree of agency and potency are coordinated such that 
entities on the same level can affect each other “horizontally.” Hence 
acting “downwards” is unproblematic: The agent is more powerful, and 
the patient more susceptible, than is strictly necessary. Conversely, acting 
“upwards” (including physical bodies acting on immaterial intellectual 
powers) is impossible: The lower agent is not powerful enough relative 
to the lesser susceptibility of the patient. For embodied minds, the dif-
ficulty is overcome precisely by embodiment and the causal power of 
the agent intellect: Human bodies are susceptible to the agency of other 
bodies, allowing apples to act on us in the first place; from there, sense 
and imagination serve as refining intermediaries that make the received 
physical apple-form apt to be abstracted by the immaterial agent intellect. 
But angels and God lack any apparatus for being affected by an apple, 
so apples cannot cause either God’s or angels’ thoughts about apples.14 
Moreover, for Aquinas, angelic intellects are arrayed along a scale of in-
creasing intellectual agency in such a way that there is only one angel at 
each “level.” So it is also impossible for lower angelic intellects to induce 
intelligible likenesses in higher angelic intellects.15 And since God is pure 
actuality, nothing at all can act on God’s intellect.
Nevertheless, Aquinas follows a long tradition of Greek and Arabic 
thought according to which non-embodied minds must know what is 
below them: It is unacceptable to construe minds as increasingly igno-
rant of reality the more powerful they are. So he needs a different way 
of establishing knower-known likeness, in order to allow for “knowing 
downwards.” For Aquinas, the problem is, in a way, easier to solve with 
respect to God than angels, because God has a causal relationship with 
everything that is lower than himself. So (since every agent makes its pa-
tient like itself), all creatures are like God, and this likeness is sufficient for 
God to know creatures without being causally affected by them.16 In other 
13ST I 79.5 ad 1; I 84.6c and ad 2; SCG I 65, III 84. For puzzles about human and angelic 
cognition generated by this principle, see ST I 84.6. 
14See ST I 55.2 ad 2.
15ST I 106.3 (and see I 106.1 on what it means for one angel to enlighten another). The 
situation with inter-angelic knowledge is somewhat more complicated than this summary 
might suggest. Aquinas admits in I 56.2 that since angels all belong to the same intellectual 
genus, any angel can know any other “by its essence,” i.e., by the natural likeness that one 
angel has to the other (though it is unclear whether Aquinas thinks this would be sufficient 
for being acquainted with the other angel as an individual). Aquinas also allows that any 
angel can disclose its thoughts to any other other regardless of hierarchical order, but since 
this angelic “speech” merely removes the obstacle to knowledge and apparently does not 
involve any causal action of the “speaker” on the “listener’s” intellect (I 107.1, ad 1; 107.2), it 
does not violate the principle that the lower cannot act on the higher.
16See ST I 14–15; and In I Sent. d.36; DV 2.1–5 and 3.1–3; SCG I 45–55, with discussion in 
Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas; Wippel, Thomas Aquinas on the Divine Ideas. On the divine 
likeness in creation, see ST I 93. 
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words, the likeness whereby God knows creatures is of the second kind 
mentioned above, caused by the knower who brings into existence objects 
like himself or herself. In these cases, the form whereby Int causes and 
thereby knows x is called an “exemplar.” So let us call this kind of likeness 
“exemplar likeness”:
Exemplar likeness: Int knows x by exemplar likeness if and only the 
form whereby Int knows x is the form whereby Int brings x into exis-
tence.
For Aquinas, God’s idea of x is an exemplar of x only if it is actually used 
to bring x into existence. God does not create everything that he could 
create but knows the full extent of his power to create. Thus for Aquinas, 
some of God’s ideas—those of non-created possibles—are not properly 
“exemplars.”17
Aquinas draws an analogy between God’s exemplar knowledge of crea-
tures and the human artist’s exemplar knowledge of his own products. 
For instance, inasmuch as Fallingwater is the realization of Frank Lloyd 
Wright’s architectural idea, Wright can enjoy practical knowledge of Fall-
ingwater even in the absence of any corresponding sensory experience, 
without visiting the site at all. Still, there is an important difference be-
tween God’s exemplar knowledge and human practical knowledge. God’s 
exemplar knowledge extends to individuals in their concrete existence, 
whereas Wright’s practical knowledge of Fallingwater does not (what 
exactly this means, we shall see in § 2). Moreover, human artistic ideas 
are themselves the result of recombining and rearranging images and ab-
stracted species acquired through sensory experience. Thus although our 
ideas, like God’s, can be patterns for new artificial forms, human exemplar 
knowledge operates within a broader framework of abstractive likeness, 
dependent on sensory experience.
It is important to keep in mind that because likeness tracks causal 
dependence, exemplar likeness runs in the opposite “direction” from ab-
stractive likeness. Although Aquinas allows that in our ordinary speech 
we frequently speak of God’s Ideas as “likenesses” of creatures, strictly 
speaking it is creatures who are “like” the divine essence. Creatures are 
the realizations of the “divine Ideas”—which are nothing other than the 
divine essence itself, considered in different ways as the exemplar that 
different creatures are like. And thus God knows all creatures not insofar 
as he is like them, but insofar as they are like him, existing as likenesses of 
himself, which he causes.18
This direction of likeness does not affect the occurrence of knowing: As 
long as knower and known have some relationship of likeness in either 
17See ST I 15.3. On exemplar causation, see Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas, 1–43.
18See SCG I 29. Despite this technical precision, Aquinas elsewhere does not hesitate to 
describe the divine essence imprecisely as the “likeness of” creatures, e.g., ST I 15.2 ad 1.
425Embodied vs. Non-Embodied Modes of Knowing in Aquinas
direction, knowing can occur. But as we’ll see shortly, the direction of like-
ness does matter a great deal to the way the resulting knowing is structured.
In any case, the notion of exemplar likeness is of no help to angels, i.e., 
non-embodied created intellects. Aquinas breaks with many of his ancient 
sources in denying that angels are creators or even intermediaries of God’s 
creative act.19 So how can angels know what is below them, if they are 
neither acted upon by what is below them (so, no abstractive likeness), 
nor produce what is below them (so, no exemplar likeness)? Aquinas 
gets around these constraints by attributing to angels a derivative kind 
of likeness: God causes in them intelligible species that are like his own 
exemplar knowledge of the entire existing created order:
There is in God the likeness of all things both with respect to form and with 
respect to matter, insofar as there preexists in him as in the cause everything 
that is found in things. And for the same reason the species of angelic intel-
lects, which are certain derivative likenesses from the divine essence, are 
the likenesses of things not only with respect to form but also with respect 
to matter.20
Although Aquinas describes species as “flowing”21 into or “impressed” 
on the angelic intellect,22 he is not suggesting that God bestows them as a 
supernatural gift on angelic intellects that would otherwise know nothing 
but themselves. Rather, for Aquinas, it belongs to the nature of a created 
non-embodied intellect to reflect the divine Ideas in “intelligible being,” par-
allel to creatures’ reflecting the divine Ideas in their “natural being.”23 Indeed, 
Aquinas meticulously distinguishes this natural knowledge from angels’ 
supernatural knowledge of created beings in the beatific vision.24
So we could perhaps think of non-embodied intellects precisely as the 
created images, in the order of being, of the divine intellect qua creative 
principle. As such, their nature requires that their intellects be innately 
formed with the likenesses of the divine Ideas, i.e., the exemplars whereby 
God creates and knows whatever he creates.25
In short, then, the angelic intellect’s likeness to other creatures is caused 
neither by the other creature itself, nor by the knower—but by the divine 
intellect. We can call this exemplar-like likeness.26
19As he tells us in DV 8.8.
20ST I 57.2 ad 2. See also I 55.2 ad 1; I 56.2; I 89.4; QDDA 20 ad 8; and In II Sent. d.3 3.3. 
Often Aquinas merely says that angelic species are had by participating in God the Creator 
(ST I 57.2 ad 2; Super Librum De causis 10; DSS 14; SCG II 100). On angelic cognition see Goris, 
“Angelic Knowledge,” 149–186; Nani-Suarez, Connaissance et langage, 17–76.
21Effluxum (ST I 55.2 and 56.2; QDDA 20).
22Impressa, indita (ST I 56.2; indita is also applied to natural inclinations, I 60.1 ad 2 and 3).
23ST I 56.2c; ST I 56.3c; ST I 55.2; SCG II 46; QDDA 18 and 20. “L’ange est aussi le miroir 
intelligible de l’ensemble de l’univers créé” (Nani-Suarez, Connaissance et langage, 166).
24See, e.g., ST I 57.5.
25ST I 57.2c and ad 3; SCG II 100; DV 8.8 and 8.14 ad 11. 
26See DV 8.8 ad 1.
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Exemplar-like likeness: Int knows x by a exemplar-like likeness if and 
only if the form whereby Int knows x is caused by the form that is x’s 
exemplar likeness.
We can call the intelligible forms or species whereby angels know, caused 
as imprints of God’s own knowledge, “exemplar-like species.” These 
species, Aquinas explains, conform an angelic intellect to all other crea-
tures—not only to physical creatures, but also other angels.27 Moreover, 
just as God’s exemplar likeness only includes what he actually creates, not 
the infinity of possibles that he could create, so too the second-hand exem-
plar likeness in angels is a likeness only to what actually exists.28
It is worth emphasizing that exemplar-like likenesses have a peculiar 
status: not only are they “likenesses of [created] things,” but they are also 
(as one might expect given Aquinas’s theory of causation) “participated 
likenesses of the divine essence”29 and “exceedingly like the ideal reasons 
existing in the divine mind.”30 While one might at first suppose that a 
likeness of a divine Idea would have to be dramatically different from a 
likeness of an apple, on Aquinas’s view the two roles are not actually in 
competition. Some angel’s exemplar-like species is like apples in virtue of 
being like the divine Idea “Apple,” of which apples are the likeness. Aquinas 
puts it even more precisely: What angels have is “a likeness of the whole 
thing inasmuch as it is brought forth by God in an exemplary way.”31 So it 
is not just the case that exemplar-like species “apple” and physical apples 
are like each other because they are each like some common cause (in the 
manner of two daughters who look like each other to the extent to which 
they each resemble their mother). Rather, by exemplar-like species, angels 
are assimilated to apples under a certain aspect, i.e., they grasp apples pre-
cisely as expressions of a preeminent Idea “Apple.” (Similarly, one might 
27ST I 56.2, and see note 15 above. Interestingly, Aquinas hold that an angel’s innate 
exemplar-like species assimilate it to all existing creatures, which would seem to include 
also angels higher than itself. So although there is no principled reason preventing a higher 
angel from causing its likeness in the lower angel, it seems that this causation would be 
superfluous for securing the lower angel’s acquaintance with the higher angel. Nevertheless, 
Aquinas suggests that higher angels do act on lower angels—but not to acquaint the lower 
angels with themselves, but rather to educate the lower angel concerning what the higher 
angel sees in a more comprehensive and unified way (ST I 106.1–4).
28Angelic species are likenessess of the “factive forms” (creative likenesses or exemplars) 
in God (see DV 8.8 and 8.11), and hence know only the “things” (i.e., existing things; see DV 
8.12). God alone can know all the possibles that are in his power (ST I 14.5, 9, 12). Angelic 
species thus apparently track perfectly the state of the created universe as it changes (see DV 
8.15 ad 4; ST I 56.2 ad 4). 
29ST I 89.4. The Latin here has participatae similitudines illius divinae essentiae, and I think 
there should be no hesitation in reading the genitive as modifying similitudines, not partic-
ipatae. When Aquinas wants to describe A as that in which B participates, he uses adverbs 
(“participates from / in A,” de, ab, ex, in) or the accusative (participates A), never the genitive. 
In contrast, the genitive is a perfectly normal way of identifying A as that “of which” B is a 
likeness. 
30In II Sent. d.3 3.3; see also DV 8.8 and SCG II 100.
31In II Sent. d. 3. 3.3 ad 1; see also In II Sent. d.3 3.1 ad 2; DV 8.11.
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approach Homer’s Iliad as translated into English by Alexander Pope.) We 
will see in the next section why this is important.
2. Different Species, Different Universals
This distinction between abstracted species and exemplar-like species is, 
I contend, central to Aquinas’s account of what is distinctive of embodied 
knowing, as opposed to non-embodied knowing. According to Aquinas, 
actions are distinguished in kind according to the kind of form that en-
ables the agent to produce such an action. So the act of understanding 
performed in virtue of an abstracted species is different in kind from the act 
performed in virtue of an exemplar-like species.32 But one might suppose 
that this difference in kind cannot really be very significant. After all, the 
difference between the two kinds of intelligible species is simply grounded 
in the direction of the causal act that produces the likeness that makes 
knowing possible. In one case, the likeness is caused in the knower by 
physical objects; in the other, it is caused in physical things by the knower 
(the Creator). As long as the intellect and object are ultimately united by a 
likeness relation, why should the cause of that likeness matter?
The reason, fundamentally, is that for Aquinas, the cause of an intel-
ligible likeness affects what the intellect is able to understand in virtue 
of that likeness.33 Now as readers of Aquinas are aware, he identifies an 
important difference between embodied human knowing and angelic or 
Divine knowing: namely, non-embodied intellects are able to grasp ma-
terial particulars, whereas our embodied intellects cannot (we can only 
imagine particulars, but not apprehend them intellectually). Aquinas ex-
plains that the degree and extent of any effect’s likeness to its cause varies 
in accord with the efficacy of a cause’s power to assimilate an effect to 
itself. When a material object (e.g., Fido) causes its likeness “dog” in my 
intellect through the phantasm “Fido” acting in the power of the agent 
intellect, something is lost in translation: The phantasm’s restriction to 
representing “this dog Fido” fails to be communicated to the abstracted 
species “dog” in the process. The resulting abstracted species is the like-
ness only of what Fido is, not of Fido in his particularity as this, existing 
here and now. So an abstracted species can only be a likeness to the essences 
of material particulars, never to those particulars qua particular.34 (This is 
why the embodied mode of knowing is, for Aquinas, an objectively less 
32QDDA 7 ad 1; In IV Sent. d.50 1.2 ad 4. This claim seems to conflict with ST I 89.6 ad 
2, which argues that embodied and disembodied souls use abstracted species in different 
ways, because “diversus modus intelligendi non provenit ex diversa virtute specierum, sed 
ex diverso statu animae intelligentis.” But there Aquinas is not denying that kinds of species 
differentiate kinds of intellection. The point is merely that although the abstracted species 
naturally provokes a certain kind of intellection (“by turning to phantasms”—see §2 below), 
nonetheless when disembodiment prevents the conditions for such intellection from being 
met, the soul can still use abstracted species in a truncated way.
33See especially SCG I 65.
34ST I 86.1; but note ad 3, emphasizing that the intellect is not in itself incapable of 
grasping singulars. Rather, the obstacle for us is that physical singulars cannot be grasped 
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perfect kind of knowing than a non-embodied mode, although this lesser 
degree of perfection is not what most fundamentally defines embodied 
knowing as a distinct kind of knowing.)
In contrast, God causes a creature in its entirety—form, matter, and ex-
istence—and continues to conserve the creature in being at every moment 
of its existence. Hence the creature’s likeness to the divine intellect goes 
“all the way down,” so to speak, to the creature’s metaphysical foundation. 
Thus God’s exemplar knowledge extends not only to dog-nature, but to 
Fido and Spot in all their concrete existing-here-and-now singularity. And 
the same, therefore, is true of non-embodied intellects’ exemplar-like spe-
cies. Hence God’s knowledge by exemplar likeness (and therefore angels’ 
knowledge by exemplar-like likeness) goes farther than human artists’ 
exemplar knowledge of their artistic products. Frank Lloyd Wright’s ex-
emplar knowledge of Fallingwater causes, and hence extends to, merely 
the artificial form of Fallingwater, and not the matter that constitutes Fall-
ingwater as this here and now. So if Wright were to know Fallingwater by 
practical knowledge from his sickbed, without ever going to see the struc-
ture, he would know it merely as “a house of a certain type.” In contrast, 
God and angels grasp Fallingwater as it is in itself, existing here and now, 
with the same immediacy and presence that characterizes our sensory 
experience of Fallingwater.35
From this distinction, it is tempting to conclude that the difference be-
tween knowing by abstracted species vs. exemplar-like species is simply a 
matter of a quantative difference in the “scope” of each kind of species. As 
it seems, abstracted species extend to dog-nature, whereas exemplar-like 
species extend to dog-nature plus the individuating features of individual 
dogs. Aquinas even seems to suggest as much when he says: “Angels cog-
nize singulars by universal forms, which are, nevertheless, likenesses of 
things both with respect to universal principles and principles of individ-
uation.”36
But such remarks create a misleading impression. In reality, I contend, 
Aquinas’s exemplar-like species are not more comprehensive than ab-
stracted species in some merely additive sense. Rather, we ought to think 
of the difference between these two kinds of species in terms of appre-
hending different kinds of universals. (There is no room here to explore the 
relationship between the universal that is understood and the intelligible 
species.37 By “apprehending a universal” I simply mean to refer to a cer-
tain kind of cognitive experience without asserting anything about its 
structure or about the ontology of universals.) Throughout his writings, 
through abstracted species. On the “lossy” character of abstractive likeness, see Cory, “Re-
thinking Abstractionism,” 623–627.
35As summarized succinctly in ST I 14.11.
36For this additive interpretation, see Péghaire, Intellectus et ratio, 55–52; Goris, “Angelic 
Knowledge,” 160.
37See De ente et essentia 2.
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Aquinas associates abstracted and exemplar-like species with different 
kinds of universals, in line with a widespread medieval notion of the 
“threefold universal.”38 His clearest statement on this point appears in the 
early commentary on the Sentences, though the distinction appears also in 
the Summa theologiae:
What is universal is threefold: There is a certain [universal] in the thing, 
namely, its nature, which exists in particulars, although it is not in them 
with respect to actual universality. There is also a certain universal which 
is received from the thing (a re) by abstraction, and this is posterior to the 
thing; and the forms of angels are not universals in that sense. In addition, 
there is a certain universal that is [directed] toward the thing (ad rem), and 
which is prior to the thing itself, like the form of a house in the mind of the 
builder; and in this way there are universal forms of things existing in the 
angelic mind—not as though they themselves were operative, but that they 
are like operative [forms], as when someone has an operative knowledge 
[only] theoretically.39
“Universal” in the first sense refers to something in actual dogs, i.e., the 
nature or essence that constitutes this individual as a dog rather than 
anything else, and which is a real metaphysical part of Fido. Note that 
properly speaking, for Aquinas, universality (unity with respect to many) 
is a property of conceptual reality—which is why he adds that the nature 
in dogs is only a potential universal.40
But our business here is with the second and third senses of “universal,” 
and it is significant for our purposes that Aquinas distinguishes them as 
different kinds of universals. The “universal” in the second sense—i.e., the 
universal “posterior to the particular” and “received from abstraction”—
is what is grasped by means of an abstracted intelligible species: namely, 
the essence “dog” conceived without restriction to that particular.41 Let us call 
this an “abstracted universal.”
The “universal” in the third sense—the universal “prior to the partic-
ular”—is what is known by angels through their exemplar-like species: 
namely, “Dog” as a preeminent causal principle that all individual dogs imitate. 
Let us call the latter an “exemplar universal.”42
38Nani-Suarez thus is right to map the difference between angelic and human intelligible 
species onto different universals: “Cette universalité [des espèces angéliques] n’a peu ou 
rien à voir avec le concept universel de l’objet que la connaissance humaine abstrait du sen-
sible” (Connaissance et langage, 33n3); but her account of the difference, in terms of “totality,” 
“purity,” “clarity,” and “transparence,” does not escape the impression of mere quantitative 
difference (Connaissance et langage, 30–33). For the medieval doctrine of the “threefold uni-
versal,” see Alain De Libera, Métaphysique et noétique, 211–264.
39In II Sent. d.3 3.2 ad 1; compare ST I 55.3 ad 1; I 85.3 ad 1. 
40The common nature that all dogs share exists in each dog as fully individuated (De ente 
et essentia 2; In I Sent. d.19 5.1), so he sometimes calls it a potential ‘universal’ (QDDA 3 ad 7).
41ST I 85.1 ad 1.
42Contra Nani-Suarez (Connaissance et langage, 30), it seems to me that the general notion 
of the universale ad rem in Aquinas encompasses both the divine Ideas and to angelic species, 
just as it does in Albertus Magnus (De Libera, La querelle, 245–262).
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“Knowing the exemplar universal ‘Dog’” refers to the cognitive expe-
rience that an angel has when it exercises the exemplar-like species that 
is a likeness of the divine Idea “Dog” (or one of the possible cognitive ex-
periences facilitated by that species—an angel also uses the same species 
to consider just Fido as an expression of the exemplar universal “Dog,” 
as we’ll see in a moment). I should note that caution is warranted here, 
since one might think that in knowing the exemplar universal “Dog,” the 
angel is simply cognizing the divine Idea “Dog.” Indeed, normally, for 
Aquinas, to cognize A by a likeness directly caused by A would be to cog-
nize A directly, in a manner analogous to sensory vision. And recall that 
exemplar-like species are likenesses of creaturely realities only in virtue of 
being likenesses of the divine Ideas. But cognition of God is a special case, 
since no created likeness to God (including exemplar-like species) can ad-
equately assimilate the creature to the divine essence. So even though the 
angel’s exemplar-like species are directly caused by God’s exemplar Ideas, 
these species cannot enable the angel to “see” the divine essence (or the 
Ideas, which are identical to the divine essence).43 What angels grasp by 
their innate species, then, is something that is like a divine Idea; or to put 
it another way, their experience of “Dog” is a lesser participation in the 
divine Idea “Dog” itself, which falls short of direct vision.44
So what does Aquinas mean when he says that abstracted and exemplar 
universals—that which is understood by intellects formed, respectively, 
by abstracted vs. exemplar-like species—are different kinds of universals? It 
is hard to articulate the difference between them, due (Aquinas might say) 
to our lack of experience with exemplar universals, which we understand 
only by comparison to the abstracted universals with which we are fa-
miliar. And the temptation is to distinguish them into quantitatively more 
43On how angels know God naturally, see ST I 56.3. Note that in ST I 58.6–7, he distin-
guishes the kind of natural knowledge of creatures under consideration here (which he calls 
“evening knowledge) from a supernatural, beatific knowledge of creatures “by the rationes 
of things existing in the Word” (“morning knowledge”); I am grateful to an anonymous 
reviewer for encouraging me to consider this distinction. In the ST texts, Aquinas describes 
the angels’ “morning knowledge” of apples as the knowledge of apples that angels have 
through beholding the divine essence as causal principle of apples. (The difference between 
morning and evening knowledge is put somewhat differently in the earlier In II Sent. d.12 
1.3 and DV 8.16–17.)
44I am not suggesting that all natural angelic knowing is a thinking about God, but rather, 
that natural angelic knowing is precisely the sort of cognitive experience that an intellect has 
when it is assimilated to God by creaturely forms proportionate to its own nature. Consider 
Aquinas’s remarks about how angels know God through their natural powers (ST I 56.3). By 
their own natural powers, he says, angels cognize God by a likeness, i.e., the likeness their 
own nature bears to him. So in knowing God through their own likeness to him, angels do 
not “see” the divine essence. But neither is their knowing wholly indirect, in the manner of 
a viewer who sees something reflected in some third-party entity such as a mirror. An angel’s 
natural knowledge of God is therefore structured in a vision-like way, but is not properly 
a “seeing” of the divine essence. What Aquinas is describing here is, perhaps, a kind of 
cognition that falls short of direct vision, but which remains experiential in some sense. One 
could, I think, plausibly apply the same line of analysis to the situation at hand: namely, 
when an angel grasps the exemplar universal “Dog,” this is not a direct vision of the divine 
Idea “Dog,” but a lesser, darkened creaturely approximation of the divine Idea “Dog.” 
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complete and less complete versions of something univocally universal. 
But instead, I suggest, we should regard the difference between them as 
a difference between two kinds of one-to-many relationships, or two modes of 
universality.
In other words, my contention is that the crucial distinction here is not 
merely quantitative, as though an abstracted universal would only in-
clude generic “dog” while an exemplar universal would include “dog” + 
“Fido” + “Spot,” etc. Rather, the difference has to do with the internal 
structure of the universal—and hence what it means to be a universal, a 
one-to-many—in the first place. Abstracted vs. exemplar universals relate 
to the relevant particulars as one-to-many in different ways. An abstracted 
universal is one-to-many in the sense of being indeterminate with respect 
to, or in potency to, many determinate entities: It is indifferently applicable 
to a set of particulars. “Dog” as abstracted universal—what we grasp by 
means of an abstracted species—is the nature that exists in a dog, under-
stood as indifferent to this or that particular dog.45 Universality, for the 
abstracted universal, is therefore a logical property of the conceptual-
ization of common natures that really exist determinately in this or that 
individual. 
Or to put it another way: The intelligible species “dog” represents uni-
versally “insofar as it is the likeness of all and leads to the cognition of all 
insofar as they are [dogs],” applying a uniform account “to all individuals 
outside the soul” that have this metaphysical part or essence.46 In contrast, 
“Dog” as exemplar universal, i.e., what is conceived through an exem-
plar-like species, is a “one” that is the cause of being—the entire being—of 
many.47 Exemplar “Dog” is the intensive perfection of dogness, which causes 
each individual dog as its likeness, and whose being and causal power cannot be 
adequately expressed by any individual dogs or even by all of them taken together. 
Indeed, as it is in itself (a divine Idea), exemplar “Dog” just is the divine 
essence, “the perfect likeness of all things,” considered as imitated by ex-
isting dogs48—or speaking more properly, they are like it. Considered in 
this light, exemplar “Dog” is like a Platonic Form (as Aquinas explicitly 
45ST I 85.2 ad 2.
46De ente et essentia 2; and In I Sent. d.23 1.1, which similarly emphasizes that names for es-
sences refer to something of the individual: either “humanity” referring to a part of Socrates 
and prescinding from individuality, or “human being” referring to the whole of Socrates but 
without determination to Socrates. Again, in In De divinis nominibus 5.1, Aquinas says that in 
species and genera such as “man” and “animal,” “comprehenduntur universalia principia in 
actu, singularia autem in potentia: homo enim dicitur qui habet humanitatem, absque prae-
cisione individualium principiorum.” Universals of this sort are “less determinate” (minus 
determinata, In Post. An. 2.16, n. 6) or “in some way contracted,” i.e., bound to what is less 
than the singular (quodammodo contractae, De subst. sep. 16). For us to know universally is to 
know generically, remaining in potency to what is more specific (ST I 85.3, where he traces 
this potency to the fact that our intellectual knowledge originates in the senses, and that our 
intellect “proceeds from potency to act”; see also In Physicorum I 1 and In Physicorum VII 6; In 
Meteorologicorum I 1.1; In Posteriorum analyticorum I 38, n. 7). 
47See DV 2.3 ad 8.
48ST I 84.2 ad 3; I 15.1 ad 3.
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states49), serving as the cause of all dogs as its likenesses in “natural being,” 
as well as the cause of exemplar-like intelligible species in non-embodied 
intellects as its likenesses “in intelligible being.”50 So angels, whose intel-
lects are naturally formed by exemplar-like species, understand individual 
dogs precisely as the likenesses of this preeminent cause “Dog.”
The exemplar universal “Dog” that angels grasp by exemplar-like 
species, then, is not a generic concept that applies indifferently to partic-
ulars. It represents neither dog-nature as a metaphysical part of a dog, 
nor dogness-plus-the-individuating-characteristics-of-all-dogs, nor the 
set of all dogs. Rather, what angels grasp is the “perfection” of dogness 
existing more eminently (eminentius) or more truly (verius) or more ex-
cellently (secundum modum excellentem) than it does in dogs.51 Or to put 
it another way, the angelic concept of universal “Dog” is a concept of 
Dog-as-preeminent-standard, or Dog as the total cause of all dogs in their 
individual existence. Consequently, this sort of universal “Dog” does not 
abstract from, but preeminently includes, the concrete singular reality of 
every real individual dog that imitates it. There is no reality in Fido that is 
not more eminently in “Dog” as its cause. Thus for Aquinas, it is precisely 
because angels are assimilated to the exemplar universal “Dog,” which 
unifies the perfection of every real dog, that angels apprehend individual 
dogs “as they subsist in their own natures” individually and materially:
Things are in angelic cognition in just the same way as they flow from God 
so that they subsist in their own natures. For it is clear that from God, there 
flows into things not only that which pertains to the universal nature, but 
also the principles of individuation, and therefore he is the cause of the 
whole substance of the thing, both respect to its matter and its form. And 
according to his causing, so too he knows, for his knowledge is the cause of 
the thing as was said above. Therefore just as God is the likeness of all things 
by his essence, whereby he causes all things, and by [his essence] he causes 
everything not only with respect to universal natures but also with respect 
to their singularity, so too by the species impressed in them by God, angels 
cognize things not only according to their universal nature but also accord-
ing to their singularity, insofar as [those species] are certain multiplied rep-
resentations of that unified and simple essence.52
49ST I 84.5; SCG I 54. Elsewhere Aquinas rejects the Platonic doctrine of Forms, but only 
when taking Forms as creative principles distinct from God, e.g., Proclus’s “gods” (SCG I 
51–52, Super Librum de causis 10 and DSS 14). 
50As Doolan points out, Aquinas holds that Fido’s causal principle is God’s Idea of the 
individual, “Fido”; and Doolan further concludes, on the basis of ST I 15.3 ad 4, that Fido’s 
causal principle is not some more general Idea “Dog” (Aquinas on the Divine Ideas, 124–133). 
Nevertheless, I would suggest that Aquinas’s remarks in that text could equally be taken as 
implying that the Idea “Dog,” qua causal principle of Fido, is identical to the Idea “Fido” 
(since what God creates is always this or that dog, not dogness as such). This would be 
consistent with Aquinas’s insistence that for angels, reflecting God, universal knowledge 
includes knowledge of particulars (ST I 55.2)
51DV 4.6; ST I 14.6; DSS 16; Quaestiones disputatae de potentia 7.7 ad 5. 
52ST I 57.2.
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So the contrast between the kinds of knowing enabled by abstractive vs. 
exemplar species can be put as follows (although the quantifying language 
of “richer, poorer,” or “more, less” must be understood merely metaphor-
ically). The abstracted universal “dog” is “intensionally poorer” than 
any particular dog. The dog-nature as conceived through an abstracted 
species is only part of the reality that is Fido, i.e., “dog” is merely “what 
Fido is.” As we saw above, this partiality is imposed by the causal history 
of abstracted universals: The phantasms are unable to communicate to an 
abstracted species their own representational restriction to this individual 
Fido. Hence there is more to Fido than an abstracted intelligible species 
can capture. In contrast, the exemplar universal “Dog” is ontologically 
and intensionally “richer” than any given particular dog that imitates 
it. What angels apprehend when they grasp “Dog” is something that is 
ontologically “more real” than the dogs that imitate it, inasmuch as un-
created being “is” to a greater degree than created being; Aquinas insists 
that the nature of dogness is “more truly” in its exemplar cause than it 
is in dogs themselves.53 Indeed, neither Fido nor Spot nor all actual dogs 
could exhaust the ways in which dogs can be like the exemplar universal 
“Dog,” and the exemplar includes all of them as its real expressions. By 
analogy: Abstracted universal “dog” is related to Fido and Spot as the 
concept “color” is related to the determinate colors blue and green. But 
the exemplar universal “Dog” is related to various dogs as white light is 
related to blue light and green light, inasmuch as at least phenomenolog-
ically, white light appears to be some one thing from which blue and green 
light proceed, which is other than, and not a part of, either of them. (In 
reality, white light is of course a mixture of all light wavelengths, so in that 
respect the analogy falls short.)
We can thus see that angelic knowing and our embodied knowing, 
for Aquinas, are fundamentally different in structure. It is not as though 
angelic knowing consists in grasping an abstracted universal (“dog” ab-
stracted from the existence of real dogs) plus a lot of existing dogs. Rather, 
non-embodied minds have a wholly different mode of access to reality. 
We experience reality from the bottom-up: Abstract universal knowing 
is something added to our conscious experience of real things. Our grasp 
of this or that dog or bird as a real existing thing is separable from our 
grasp of “dog” or “bird” in the abstract. But non-embodied minds expe-
rience reality from the top-down; their experience of universality is of a 
supereminently existing perfection as it is expressed in existing things, and 
of those things as expressions of that preeminent perfection. “Knowing 
53See DV 4.4, where Aquinas emphasizes that the truth of a thing is more perfectly found 
in God than in the thing itself, although a predicate, e.g., “dog,” is more properly applied 
to the thing than to its exemplar (this is consistent with his distinction between abstracted 
and emanated universals, since predication is a feature of human knowing and hence the 
predicate “dog” expresses an abstracted universal). On the ways in which Aquinas allows 
that divine Ideas are “more real” than the creatures that imitate them and comparison with 
Plato, see Doolan, “Aquinas on Divine Ideas and the Really Real,” 1059–1091.
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the exemplar ‘Dog’” is not opposed to knowing Fido—it is the means of 
knowing Fido. The way that angels apprehend Fido is precisely as a ma-
terial realization or imitation of exemplar “Dog.” That is why non-embodied 
and embodied knowing is different in kind.
To illustrate the difference with the case of sick Fido:54 A human veteri-
narian, with her knowledge of an abstracted universal “dog,” would know 
what dog health should be and what kinds of physiological failures dogs 
are liable to suffer. But in order to treat Fido, she needs to use her senses 
to obtain information about his particular, sensorily accessible, physical 
states, and apply her abstract knowledge of dog-health to Fido to pro-
duce an educated guess of what is wrong with Fido and what might cure 
him. For the veterinarian’s embodied mind, universal knowledge comes 
apart from the concrete existence of real dogs, and this knowledge can 
only be applied by reconnecting it with these existing things. In contrast, 
an angelic veterinarian who knows the exemplar “Dog” begins with the 
existing source of the existence of lesser, dependent dogs: the “one” from 
which the “many” dogs are, as it were, unpacked. The angel’s knowledge 
does not have to be applied to the world of existents, because it is already a 
knowledge of what exists: In grasping the exemplar universal “Dog,” the 
angelic veterinarian already immediately grasps Fido as a created expres-
sion of that preeminent reality, and Fido’s sickness, and the appropriate 
cure—not as additional bits of information alongside Fido’s dogness, 
but from the top down, unfolded from what is preeminently in the 
exemplar “Dog.”
This distinction in Aquinas between abstracted vs. exemplar univer-
sals resurrects a classical distinction between forms that are posterior to 
and abstracted from sensory experience, and those that are prior to and 
the causes of things.55 Moreover, the difference in how abstracted vs. 
exemplar universals relate to particulars turns out to be merely another 
way of considering Aquinas’s view that the one-way likeness relation 
between intellect and object runs in different directions for embodied 
vs. non-embodied cognition, as described earlier. Individual dogs are a 
likeness of, and hence lesser than and derivative of, exemplar universal 
“Dog”—whereas the abstracted universal “dog” is a likeness of, and 
hence lesser than and derivative of, individual dogs. Abstracted “dogness” 
or “dog” is the conceptualization of something real in Fido, a predicate 
applicable to Fido and others of his ilk in virtue of their sharing a common 
nature—whereas exemplar “Dog” is the cause of and standard for Fido in 
his whole being.56 The abstracted universal is thus a “principle of cogni-
tion only,” in contrast to exemplar universals or divine Ideas, which are, 
54With thanks to a referee for suggesting this illustration.
55See Helmig, Forms and Concepts, 208–221; De Libera, La querelle, 103–124, 182–185, and 
245–262 (curiously overlooking Aquinas’s acceptance of this doctrine). For this distinction 
in Aquinas’s teacher Albertus Magnus, see Krause and Anzulewicz, “Albert der Große”; De 
Libera, “Albert le Grand,” 89–119.
56On the predicability of the universale post rem, see De Libera, “Albert le Grand,” 109.
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like the Platonic Forms, principles both of cognition and of being (prin-
cipium essendi).57
3. Turn to Phantasms: The Embodied Intellect’s Partnership with Imagination
We can now see that the significance of there being two different causes of 
intellectual assimilation (God causing exemplar-like species that are like 
the divine Ideas, vs. physical objects causing abstracted species that are 
like the nature of a dog), is that these causes produce different kinds of 
universal knowledge. By exemplar-like species, a non-embodied intellect 
apprehends the exemplar universal “Dog,” and in doing so apprehends 
Fido as a unique if limited expression of this ontologically richer idea. By 
abstracted species, an embodied intellect apprehends something of Fido, 
the essence that constitutes him as a dog, and that he shares with other 
dogs. These are differently-structured intellectual experiences, different 
kinds of mental states.
The effect of embodiment on the human experience of understanding 
now begins to come clear. Our intellectual grasp of Fido is limited to his 
membership in a certain kind. If we attempt to consider what it is to be a 
dog, apart from our experiences of existing dogs, we seem to be trying to 
grasp something abstract, thinner, more uncertain, and less real than the 
dogs encountered in sense experience—precisely because an embodied 
understanding grasps “dog” as an abstraction from what really exists.58 
Universality, as we experience it, ultimately consists in no more than a 
concept’s indifferent applicability to many individuals, because it falls 
short of capturing their complete being.
With all this in mind, it is now possible to give a new rationale for 
Aquinas’s much-discussed claim that embodied knowers can know 
only by “turning to phantasms.” Interpreters have disagreed about how 
strictly this requirement holds, and what phenomenon he has in mind. He 
is taken, variously, (1) to be asserting, as a brute psychological fact, that 
all our thinking is accompanied by mental picturing,59 or (2) more loosely 
to be describing some sort of pedagogical role of images in our abstract 
thinking: e.g., that concrete illustrations are useful (but not necessary) in 
helping us to grasp abstract concepts,60 or that our intellects are naturally 
“oriented” toward imagination.61
57ST I 85.3 ad 1 and ad 4; I 15.1. Aquinas also sometimes calls abstracted universals “uni-
versal forms” and the divine Ideas “universal causes” (DV 2.4 ad 7), though these terms also 
have other usages. 
58De spiritualibus creaturis 9 ad 6, reporting the Aristotelian position that Aquinas accepts. 
The view is reflected in ST I 85.3 ad 4; as well as I 85.1 ad 1; I 85.2 ad 2. 
59Lonergan, ‘Verbum’: Word and Idea in Aquinas, 160; and Kenny, Aquinas on Mind, 93–99.
60Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 289–295. For Pasnau, the “turn” refers to the 
experience of coming up with examples and pictures in the process of trying to understand 
an abstract concept. 
61Kretzmann, “Philosophy of Mind,” 142; Klubertanz, “St. Thomas and the Knowledge 
of the Singular,” 148–150.
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Elsewhere I argued that Aquinas’s account of “turning to phantasms” 
is in part a claim about the embodied intellect’s natural orientation to 
imagination, but that the implications for occurrent abstract thinking re-
mained to be made clear.62 I now want to spell out those implications, and 
my proposal is as follows: For Aquinas, our abstract thinking necessarily 
includes an imaginative component—but not for psychological or peda-
gogical reasons, as though the embodied mind needs a constant stream of 
illustrations in its attempt to digest abstract concepts. Rather, the reason is 
that the kind of abstract thinking that we do (given the kind of universals 
we know) cannot fully assimilate us to real things without being com-
pleted by an imaginative component. In other words, embodiment not 
only determines what we know by abstracted species, but also shapes the way 
in which we exercise abstracted species and understand abstracted univer-
sals.63 The way in which abstracted species ought properly to be exercised 
in an intellectual act—indeed, the only way they can be exercised by an 
embodied intellect—is what Aquinas calls “understanding by turning to 
phantasms.” So embodied knowing is fundamentally an imagistic mode 
of knowing (taking “imagistic” broadly to indicate a variety of sensory 
content, not merely visual content), in the sense that it essentially has an 
imaginative component. It is not a complete mode of cognition in itself 
which also happens to be accompanied by phantasms.
Let us see how this works. The much-discussed ST I 84.7c tells us why 
the embodied intellect must cognize by turning to phantasms:
The proper object of the human intellect that is conjoined to a body is the 
quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter. . . . But it belongs to such a 
nature (de ratione autem huius naturae est) to exist in some individual, which 
does not lack corporeal matter. For instance, it belongs to the nature of stone 
to be in some individual stone (de ratione naturae lapidis est quod sit in hoc 
lapide64), and to the nature of horse to be in an individual horse, and so forth. 
Thus the nature of stone, or of any material thing, cannot be cognized com-
pletely and truly unless it is cognized as existing in a particular (ut in par-
ticulari existens). But we apprehend the particular exclusively by sense and 
imagination. And therefore if the intellect is to understand its proper object, 
it must turn itself toward phantasms, so that it may behold the universal 
nature existing in the particular. If the proper object of our intellect were 
separate forms, or if the natures of sensible things subsisted apart from par-
ticulars as the Platonists thought, then our intellect would not always have 
to turn itself toward phantasms in understanding.
62Cory, “What Is an Intellectual ‘Turn’?,” 129–162.
63This distinction between what we know (in virtue of the species) and how we know it 
(in virtue of the mode of the act) is made clearly in ST I 89.6c.
64Obviously Aquinas does not mean that stoneness essentially belongs to this specific 
individual stone, e.g., the Hope Diamond, or there could only be one stone, the Hope Dia-
mond (see De ente et essentia 3). Rather, as my translation attempts to clarify, the quiddities of 
material entities necessarily exist in some individual. 
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It is significant that Aquinas justifies the “turn to phantasms” by under-
scoring the insufficiency of our intellectual assimilation to reality by means of an 
abstracted species. What we understand when we grasp abstracted “dog” 
is the “whatness” or “quiddity” (quidditas) that makes Fido be a dog. 
The quiddity “dog” properly exists only in individual physical dogs and 
derivatively in embodied knowers. (In contrast, the exemplar universal 
“Dog” that angels contemplate, properly exists independently from, and 
prior to, dogs).
As a result, fascinatingly, it turns out that “individualized physical 
being” is not accidental to “the quiddity of dogs” in the same way that, 
say, to “belonging to Mrs. Smith” is. It is possible to be a dog without be-
longing to Mrs. Smith, whereas nothing can be a dog unless it is individual 
and physical.65 Consequently, as Aquinas here concludes, the quiddity 
“dog” that we understand by abstraction cannot be “completely and 
truly” cognized unless it is cognized as existing in a materially individuated 
way in some individual dog. The “as” (ut or prout) is significant, since for 
Aquinas, to grasp something “as existing” is to have experiential access 
to that thing, analogous to visiting Mont-Saint-Michel in person instead 
of merely reading about it in a guidebook.66 So the point is that a “com-
plete and true” cognition of the quiddity of material dogs requires a direct 
experiential assimilation to some real dog in which that quiddity really, 
physically, individually exists (or at least some dog imagined as existing 
in this way). But such direct assimilation to an individually existing dog 
is exactly what an abstracted species cannot deliver, for reasons already 
discussed.
As a result, the abstracted intelligible species turns out, astonishingly, 
to be inadequate to the task of perfectly assimilating the embodied in-
tellect to its own proper object, the quiddity of material beings.67 Such 
quiddities can be cognized as they are in reality only by cognizing “the 
quiddity as it is in an individual.” So our “complete and true” assimilation 
to dog-essence in its real being must be completed by an embodied power 
that is capable of assimilating to individuals: namely, the imagination. 
Thus when I cognize “the quiddity as it is in an individual,” my intellect 
provides the assimilation to the quiddity “dog,” which is cognized “as it is 
in an individual” only because the imagination provides the assimilation 
to an individual, physical Fido, by means of the phantasm that is Fido’s 
65Indeed, Aquinas’s criticism of Plato’s doctrine of Forms is precisely for holding—as 
Aquinas thinks—that the natures of physical things (what we grasp by abstraction) subsist 
separately from those things, as though individuality and materiality were merely accidental 
to such natures. This criticism does not exclude a doctrine of divine Ideas, because these are 
not subsistent versions of abstracted universals, but rather the preeminent causes of phys-
ical, individualized dogs. See Doolan, “Aquinas on Divine Ideas and the Really Real,” 1076, 
discussing DV 4.6, ad 2 s.c.; and Owens, “Thomistic Common Nature,” 211–215.
66See ST I 57.2.
67ST I 84.7c.
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likeness.68 The “turn to phantasms,” then, is precisely the activation of an 
abstracted species in a cognition composed of intellectual and imaginative 
acts, cooperating in a broader “complete and true cognition of the quiddity 
of a material entity as it exists” (and note Aquinas’s use of the generic term 
cognoscere instead of intelligere, as though to underscore that a “complete 
and true cognition of the quiddity” cannot be exclusively intellectual).
As a result, we can see that for Aquinas, “to cognize by turning to 
phantasms” is to use an abstracted species as part of a cooperative ac-
tivity performed by intellect and imagination together. In this composite 
activity, the human knower apprehends the quiddity of material entities 
as existing in some corporeal individual (“the essence of this entity”), with 
intellect responsible for the quiddity (“the essence of . . . ”) and imagina-
tion supplying the corporeal individual existence of that quiddity in some 
object of experience (“ . . . this entity”).69 So the turn to phantasms is partly 
a “cognitive orientation”70 in the sense that abstracted species intrinsically 
refer to existing individuals present to the senses and/or imagination.71 
But orientation does not tell the whole story: The orientation is cashed out 
in the conjoint activity of intellect and imagination directing the knower’s 
attention to the quiddities of material things as they exist in an individual, 
physical way as this or that material individual—jointly grasping such 
quiddities in the only way in which they can exist. This imagistic knowing, 
the joint intellectual-imaginative “knowing by turning to phantasms,” is 
precisely the embodied mode of knowing.
4. What Is It Like To Be an Embodied Knower?
We can now put together a relatively complete picture of how em-
bodiment affects “what it is like” for us to cognize. The essential 
features of an embodied-type cognition are all traceable to the intrinsically 
downward-referring and incomplete character of the kind of universal that is 
grasped through abstraction from sensory experience. An abstracted species is 
congenitally incomplete in assimilating us to real beings. And this incom-
pleteness is remedied by the corporeal power of imagination, which fills 
in the determinate likenesses to which the intellect is indifferent: “Dog” 
is the essence of Fido. Thus the human knower can only be assimilated to 
the whole Fido by means of imagination and intellect together—the imag-
ination assimilated to Fido as this individual existing here and now, and 
the intellect assimilated to Fido as belonging to a certain kind.72 Acting 
68See ST I 85.1c.
69Klubertanz explicates our “indirect” cognition of singulars in just this way, but curiously 
without any association with the turn to phantasms; “Knowledge of the Singular,” 160–161.
70Kretzmann, “Philosophy of Mind,” 142; compare Pasnau’s opposing view, Aquinas on 
Human Nature, 289–295. 
71I analyze this reference in terms of Neoplatonic concepts of “likeness,” in “What Is an 
Intellectual ‘Turn’?”
72ST I-II 4.5; SCG II 60. 
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together, these cooperative cognitive powers enable the human being to 
become cognitively assimilated to Fido as this dog existing here and now.
To put it another way, we not only first encounter essences individual-
ized as the particulars of sense experience, but also properly understand 
essences as what makes those particulars be what they are. And that is why 
Aquinas insists that “the human intellect cannot grasp bare intelligible 
truth [as angels do], for it is connatural to it to understand by turning 
to phantasms.”73 He does not mean that embodied knowers cannot have 
genuine thoughts about “dog.” Nor does he mean that embodied knowers 
must compulsively pair every thought about abstract “dog” with a corre-
sponding image of some concrete dog, while angels are free to exercise the 
same concept without the baggage of phantasms. Rather, he means that what 
we grasp when we think by means of the abstracted species “dog” is ontologi-
cally incomplete and indeed not even fully comprehensible, apart from a 
physical individual. In short, embodied knowing is of its very nature an 
insight about physical individuals: the quiddity of a material individual, 
the essence of a dog, “what it is to be” a dog, the “whatness” of “this.”74
The embodied intellect’s cooperation with and completion by physical 
mental processes explains why it is accidentally subject to duration and 
distance, despite the fact that in itself, the intellect does not fall under the 
categories of place and time.75 My intellect is not “in” my brain except 
accidentally, insofar as it cooperates with my imagination located in my 
brain. Similarly, although the intellection of “dog” itself takes up no time 
at all, I can be said to be “thinking about dogs for a long time” because 
my dog-directed intellectual acts are completed by imaginative acts that 
do have duration.
5. The Concertgoing Angel?
In the introduction, I mentioned a second puzzle that one might raise 
in evaluating how embodiment shapes conscious experience: namely, 
whether the experiences that are linked, in us, to physiological structures 
are possible only for embodied minds. The puzzle can be considered in 
light of the thought-experiment of a concertgoing angel: Would it have (i) 
the experience that we call “hearing Beethoven’s Ninth,” or (ii) a different 
kind of experience of musical sounds, or (iii) no experience of musical 
sounds at all? Given what has just been said, it seems clear that Aquinas 
would have to deny (i). Experiences differ in kind, as we have seen, ac-
cording to the different kinds of cognitive powers. Angels are purely 
intellectual; so they cannot have the kind of experience that is proper to 
73ST I 111.1.
74Aquinas holds that disembodied souls can also use previously-abstracted species de-
spite lacking imagination (ST I 89.6). His view seems to be, then, that using the abstracted 
species necessarily elicits the completing act in the imagination unless impeded by the absence 
of a properly disposed imagination—not that abstractive species can never be used without 
imagination.
75ST I 85.4 ad 1; I 85.5 ad 2; I-II 113.7 ad 5; SCG II 96; In De memoria et reminiscentia 2. 
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sense. To put it another way: Since angelic knowing differs in kind from 
embodied knowing, which differs in kind from sensation, and since an-
gels have no kind of experience other than knowing, angelic mental states 
must differ in kind from sensation.
Such observations might seem to suggest that Aquinas will have to 
defend (iii). Indeed, although our focus so far has been on the Aquinas 
scholarship’s tendency to define our embodied intellectual activity in 
terms of deficiency, if one instead considered non-embodied vs. embodied 
conscious experience as a whole, then one might just as well have come to the 
opposite conclusion: It looks as though angels must be the ones who are 
deficient cognizers, since they lack all the bodily cognitive powers that 
are responsible for so much of the richness of our mental life in Aquinas’s 
theory of cognition. When we try to imagine “what it is like” to cognize 
as an angel, from our embodied perspective, we must strip away familiar 
experiences like “hearing Beethoven’s Ninth” or “feeling the warmth of a 
fire.” In the end, very little mental life seems to be left, and what there is 
seems to be excessively remote, abstract, and theoretical. When Aquinas 
insists that angels cognize particulars such as this symphony performance 
intellectually rather than sensorially, it is easy to conclude that their “ex-
perience” of Beethoven’s Ninth consists in a comprehensive knowledge 
of all true propositions about it, as though the angel were a recluse who 
preferred to stay at home extensively reading about Beethoven’s Ninth 
instead of hearing the performance. (Something of this worry appears in 
some contemporary critiques of Aquinas’s account of God’s knowledge of 
particulars.76)
But Aquinas rejects (iii): He insists that non-embodied created intellects 
have all the concreteness and immediacy to a present singular that humans 
can attain only by sensing that singular.77 Aquinas’s characterizations of 
exemplar vs. abstracted universals, above, helps explain why. A purely 
intellectual mode of experience might seem thin and inadequate only if 
we project on angels the “thinness” or “abstractness” of our own abstrac-
tive understanding, which prescinds from the existence of the reality. For 
embodied minds, it is one thing to know everything about Beethoven’s 
Ninth—and another thing altogether to hear the performance. It is one thing 
to understand what fire is, or what warmth is, or (propositionally) that the 
fire is warm—and another thing altogether to feel this fire’s warmth, to see, 
hear, and touch what the fire is like. So in conceptualizing pure non-embodied 
intellection, prescinding from the sensory-imaginative aspects of our own 
embodied cognition, it seems that what must be left is radically truncated: 
an unfinished grasp of “the essence of—”. But that truncated insight, 
demanding completion by the imagination, is proper to an embodied 
mode of intellectual experience. This is not how angels intellectually 
experience reality.
76See, e.g., Wolterstorff, “Suffering Love,” 127–133.
77ST I 57.2.
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So it seems to me that the view that Aquinas would embrace is (ii): 
The exemplar universals that angels apprehend do provide an experience 
of particulars such as this particular symphony performance. But their 
experience must be of another order from our own, since they experience 
particulars “top-down” as the expressions of a universal exemplar. As-
suming that there is some divine exemplar “Music” for the compositions 
and performances that God causes to exist in our world through human 
musicians as secondary causes, our concertgoing angel (and indeed any 
angel) would have something like our experience of “hearing Beethoven’s 
Ninth”—except that the experience would be something other than 
“hearing.” Again, an angel on a campground would not merely cognize 
propositionally that this fire is burning at such-and-such a temperature, 
but would directly and concretely apprehend the warmth of this campfire 
in an experience analogous to sensory feeling. 
The rationale lies in Aquinas’s theory of exemplar universals: The ex-
emplar universal apprehended by non-embodied created intellects is not 
an incompletely-apprehended quiddity of a material thing in the manner of our 
abstracted universals. Rather, it is a created reflection of the divine Idea 
“Music” or “Fire,” something ontologically complete in itself, which is 
not indifferent to particulars, but is the preeminent cause of the entire being of 
all musical instantiations or fires, of which particular instances are expres-
sions, down to the very core of their being. Thus an angelic intellectual 
experience encompasses what fire is and what this particular created fire 
is like—not in the manner of two different pieces of information, but as 
dimensions of a single experience of the being of fire.
Since we do not have experiences of this sort, but approach reality in 
a different mode through the collaboration of intellect and imagination/
sense, it is impossible for us to grasp exactly what this angelic mode of 
intellectual experiencing is like. The best we can do, perhaps, is to sug-
gest speculatively two ways in which an angelic “what it is like” must 
differ from ours, given Aquinas’s distinctions between embodied and 
non-embodied knowing. First, Aquinas notes that because they lack sense 
and imagination, angels do not encounter material particulars as poten-
tially intelligible and hence needing to be made intelligible,78 because particulars 
are already actually intelligible through the divine exemplars that angels 
grasp. Angels do not experience material particulars, in short, as lacking 
intelligibility. It is, perhaps, therefore not too much of a stretch to conclude 
thence that angels, on Aquinas’s account, simply do not experience reality 
at all in terms of the familiar tension between “what seems to the senses” 
vs. “what is known to the intellect”—a tension unavoidable for embodied 
knowers and which gives rise to the faint suspicion of the treacheries of 
sensory appearance that has haunted philosophy since Parmenides.
Second, Aquinas’s account of non-embodied cognition seems clearly 
to deny to angels and disembodied souls something essential to our 
78ST I 54.4.
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embodied experience of physical objects: namely, the experience of “what 
it is like to sense,” the “phenomenal feel” of the sense organ’s being altered 
in perception. Given what we have seen about exemplar universals in 
Aquinas, it seems that in apprehending the fire’s warmth, an angel would 
grasp “what hot fire is like,” but not “what it is like to sense heat.” In other 
words, the angelic experience of the fire would lack our familiar feeling of 
skin warming up as one approaches the fire; and the concertgoing angel’s 
experience of a symphony performance would lack the feeling of being 
shaken by waves of orchestral sound. (Indeed, Aquinas rejects a Patristic 
idea that the torment of the damned by physical fire consists in an intel-
lectual pain of being burned, for, he argues, only a physical change in the 
flesh could “introduce” the pain of being burned.79) It seems, then, that on 
his view, the phenomenal feel of being sensibly affected by a physical object is 
intellectually irreproducible.
6. Conclusion
Embodied-type intellection, then, is defined by its causal origin from and 
orientation toward physical individuals. Our embodied “mode of un-
derstanding” (modus intelligendi) is “by abstracting from and turning to 
phantasms,” whereas non-embodied intellects understand “by turning to 
intelligible things,”80 i.e., the divine exemplars. Abstracted species, caused 
by physical individuals through imagination, assimilate the intellect to 
“the quiddity of material things,” whose universality (in the sense of indif-
ference to many particulars) leaves our assimilation to reality incomplete 
without the contribution of the imagination. In other words, the embodied 
way of grasping essences is to grasp what is indeterminate to particulars, 
with reference to some particular: Dogness is the essence of a particular, 
“what it is to be that kind of being.” To put it another way, the human 
being not only is a hylormorphic being, but also knows quasi-hylomor-
phically, assimilated by multiple cognitive powers to the whole of the real 
Fido as an individual existent of a certain kind.
Our existence as intellectual organisms with our “hybrid” manner 
of knowing opens up an interesting possibility in the created order. 
Abstractive intellection, unique to embodied intellects, is the only kind 
of intellection that allows material objects to exercise agency vis-à-vis 
intellects, causing an abstracted likeness of themselves in us with the as-
sistance of the agent intellect. Our intellects thus provide the opportunity 
for material objects to take on this noble role as co-agents of intellectual 
insight.
I would like to conclude by highlighting an unresolved puzzle in 
Aquinas’s account of embodied knowing. The human existence with 
which we are familiar is an embodied existence, and so our questions 
about the peculiarly human way of knowing tend to be questions about 
79QDDA 21.
80See, e.g., ST I 85.5 ad 2; I 118.3c. For modus intelligendi, see I 57.2 ad 1; I 85.3 ad 4; I 89.1.
443Embodied vs. Non-Embodied Modes of Knowing in Aquinas
knowing in this embodied state. Consequently, it is easy to assume that 
Aquinas’s claims about our embodied, abstractive knowing are claims 
about how a human intellect must operate. But I have deliberately avoided 
making claims about the “human mode of knowing,” because it is not the 
case that Aquinas thinks the human intellect can only cognize abstrac-
tively by its nature. The disembodied human soul after death, for instance, 
becomes de facto a “separated substance,” and as we have seen, the nature 
of separated substances is to reflect the Divine Ideas. So the disembodied 
human soul now instantly acquires exemplar-like species and under-
stands by those species in the manner of an angel—and Aquinas stresses 
that the reception of such species is natural to the human intellect in that 
disembodied state.81
So it looks as though the two kinds of knowing that I have been de-
scribing should not be characterized as the acts of two different kinds of 
intellects, i.e., the human and the angelic, but rather as the acts of intellects 
that stand in a certain relation (or not) to matter, i.e., the embodied and the 
non-embodied.82 But that characterization raises unsettling anthropolog-
ical questions. If the human intellect is naturally capable of either mode 
of intellection, why do we not receive exemplar species right now in an 
embodied state? Aquinas seems to suggest that the very state of embodi-
ment itself restricts us to an abstractive mode of cognition. “It is impossible 
for our intellect, in the present state of life in which it is conjoined to a 
passible body, to understand anything actually except by turning itself 
to phantasms.”83 But if corporeality itself is the culprit, then embodiment 
seems to place us at a cognitive disadvantage by cutting us off from a 
“more eminent” mode of intellection, contrary to Aquinas’s assertion that 
embodiment is for the good of the human intellect. And in any case, why 
should embodiment prevent us from receiving species that our intellect is 
naturally capable of receiving? The situation is complicated by Aquinas’s 
tendency to insist that even the supernatural action of higher intellects 
on the embodied human knower conforms to this restriction—with a few 
curious exceptions that seem to follow no obvious pattern. Resolution of 
these difficulties, however, must be left for a later inquiry.84
University of Notre Dame
81See ST Ia 89.1.
82Disembodied souls can use their previously-acquired abstracted species, but in an in-
complete way, since once separated from the brain, they no longer turn to phantasms. See 
ST Ia 89.5–6.
83ST Ia 84.7: “[I]mpossibile est intellectum nostrum, secundum praesentis vitae statum, 
quo passibili corpori coniungitur, aliquid intelligere in actu, nisi convertendo se ad phan-
tasmata.”
84Thanks go to the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for supporting the research for 
this paper at the the Universität Würzburg, as well as to Greg Doolan and Jeff Hause for 
critiques that assisted me greatly in refining the interpretation, and to Joshua Lim and Philip 
Neri Reese for assistance preparing the manuscript.
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